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Summary findings
Gauthier and Reinikka look at how prevalent tax  three-year period remained widespread and the
exemptions and evasion are among businesses in Uganda,  dispersion of the tax burden did not decrease.
how they translate into actual tax burdens for firms of  The analysis shows that tax evasion is more prevalent
different sizes, and how the tax administration attempts  among smaller firms, that tax exemptions are more
to ensure compliance.  common among larger firms, and that medium-size firms
Despite tax reforms undertaken  in 1995-97  to increase  tend to shoulder a disproportionate share of the total tax
the efficiency and equity of the tax system and its  burden.
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Many  low-income  countries have  adopted  selective  tax  incentives for  enterprises  to
attract private investment. At the same time, the need to maintain (or increase) public
revenue, coupled with a smaller tax base due to exemptions, has meant higher tax rates
and consequently stronger incentives to evade them. The resulting tax burdens tend to be
very unequal among firms, creating distortions in the allocation of resources. To level the
playing field for firns,  recent tax reforms have focused on widening the tax base,  for
example, by reducing selective exemptions and lowering tax rates.
The evolution of Uganda's  tax system in the past decade has generally followed
this path. Its tax reforms in mid-1990s indeed attempted to shift the tax system from high
rates and  selective treatment of finns  with the expectation of more equal tax burdens.
These reforms  are, however,  complicated by opportunism that ensued during the long
period of economic mismanagement in the 1970s and 1980s when taxation was highly
predatory,  creating  a  general  mistrust  of  government  (Chen,  Matovu,  and  Reinikka
2001).1 As  a result, tax reforms have been mired by large-scale evasion and by  firms
continuing  to  seek exemptions, as well as by tax administration resorting to intrusive
collection methods.
A priori, one would expect larger firms to receive discretionary exemptions for
several reasons. First, specific investment incentives favor large investments in Uganda.
Until  recently  tax  incentives  were  project-based,  with  a  relatively  high  minimum
investment (US$300,000 for foreign frms  and US$50,000 for domestic firms). Second,
large firms are often in a stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis bureaucrats or politicians
who grant exemptions. Third, since the absolute size of the tax bill for large firms tends
to be larger, the incentive to seek exemptions is greater. Tax administration efforts that
disproportionately target larger firms in terms of enforcing compliance may, however,
mitigate  these  effects by making  it harder to  evade taxes  that  are not  exempted. By
contrast, small firms often do not qualify for tax exemptions and are not positioned  to
influence those who grant them. Instead, small firms may find it easier to slip out of the
tax collector's  net as enforcement costs could easily exceed the potential  tax revenue
collected.
' Tirole (1992)  shows  how societies  that are either  high-opportunism  or low-opportunism  can be locally
stable  equilibria.  The shortening  of horizons  and  breakdown  of contract  enforcement  mechanisms,  for
example,  during  the period of civil  disorder  or war, can shift  the society  from  a low-opportunism  to a high-
opportunism  equilibrium.  The restoration  of peace  may itself  be insufficient  to bring  the society  back  to the
low-opportunism  equilibrium  even  though,  had peace  been maintained  throughout,  the society  would  have
remained  in the low-opportunism  equilibrium.
lIn this  paper we provide an  empirical test of these hypotheses  using Ugandan
enterprise survey data. We show that tax exemptions and evasion were widespread among
businesses in 1995-97 and that their prevalence indeed varies by firm size. Tax evasion is
especially prevalent among smaller firms, while tax exemptions are more common among
larger firms, leaving medium-sized firms shouldering a disproportionate share of the total
tax burden.  If  anything, the pattern  changed  slightly for the worse  during the  survey
period, despite the tax reforms aimed at reducing dispersion. When measured in terms of
imports  and  sales  value,  the  importance  of  exemptions  actually  increased,  and  the
dispersion  of  tax  burdens,  especially  due  to  indirect  taxation,  also  appears  to  have
increased.
Regarding the role of tax administration, over 40 percent of the firms surveyed
reported audits for corporate tax, while as many as 75 percent of value added tax-paying
firms reported audits. These are extremely high shares when compared to other countries.
We find that firms audited for corporate tax and the VAT are typically larger and that
firms audited for corporate tax typically do not have access to exemptions. Furthermore,
half of the firms challenged their tax assessments. The difference between the authority's
assessment  and the  firm's  self-declaration was, on  average,  83 percent.  The analysis
shows that the probability of firms'  own assessment being different from that of the tax
administration's  is  significant  and  negatively  correlated  with  tax  exemptions.  Tax
exemptions appear to be an effective way to avoid dealings with the revenue authority,
which otherwise appears more likely to target larger firms in its effort to reduce evasion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the tax
statuses and reforms in Uganda, as well as the characteristics of the firm-level data and
sample. Section 4 examines the level of tax evasion among various  categories of firms
and how this changed during  1995-97. Section 5 explores the relationship between tax
burdens and tax exemptions and evasion among various categories of firms.  Section 6
examines tax burdens and their dispersion. Section 7 highlights the behavior of the tax
administration, and the last section concludes.
II. Tax Statuses and Tax Reforms in Uganda
Tax revenues had fallen  to  a low of  5 percent of  GDP by  the mid-1980s.  An
essential  feature of Uganda's  economic recovery was to rebuild government's  revenue
base.  Institution-building  for  tax  administration  resulted  in  the  establishment  of  the
semiautonomous  Uganda  Revenue  Authority  (URA)  in  1991,  inspired  by  Ghana's
example. Because the URA is not part of the civil service, it can attract more qualified
staff  with higher pay.  The  early tax policy  measures aimed at removing  the massive
explicit taxation on exports. The simultaneous need for public spending on social services
and infrastructure was great, which led policymakers to increase revenue collection  by
2one  percentage  point  of  GDP  per  year. They relied  on  import taxation  and  ad  hoc
increases in tax rates-particularly  fuel taxes-to  achieve the revenue target.
Although  consumers and firms in Uganda face a wide array of national and local
taxes, we focus our empirical analysis on three important taxes paid by businesses: the
corporate income tax (CIT), the sales tax/value added tax (VAT), and the National Social
2 Security Fund (NSSF) levy.
Sales Tax and the Value Added Tax
In  1995 businesses were taxed at a rate of 12-30 percent on sales of goods and
selected services. Services carried a transaction levy. Educational material, equipment,
machinery, and medical goods were not taxed. The sales tax was replaced in 1996 by a
single-rate 17 percent value added tax. A minimum sales threshold amount of Ush  20
million was initially set, and then raised to Ush 50 million a few months later. The VAT
was considered important for the effort to broaden the tax base and improve compliance,
and thus increase revenue collection. A separate department of the URA administers the
VAT. All registered  VAT taxpayers have to  file a VAT return and pay their liabilities
each month and request a refund if they have more tax credits than output liabilities in a
tax period.
Corporate Income Tax
In 1995 businesses faced a corporate income tax (CIT) of 30 percent (35 percent
for foreign firms) on reported profits, applicable to all firms operating under a common
regime. In 1997 a minimum tax based on turnover was introduced for small firms with
sales below Ush  50 million. According to the  1997 Income Tax Act firms with  sales
under Ush 20 million had a tax obligation of Ush 100,000; those with sales between Ush
20  and 30 million  had  an obligation of Ush  250,000 or  1 percent  of gross turnover,
whichever was lower; those with sales between Ush 30 and 40 million had an obligation
of Ush  350,000 or  1 percent of turnover; and those with  sales between Ush  40 to  50
million had an obligation of Ush 450,000 or 1 percent of turnover. As was the case in
1995, firms with sales above Ush 50 million were taxed at a rate of :30  percent on profits
(now also including foreign firms). 3
National Social Security Fund Levy
2 Other  taxes include  imnport  duties,  the withholding  tax, the presurnptive  tax on small  businesses,  and
the local property  tax (see  Chen,  Matovu,  and  Reinikka  2001).
3 Two types  of deductions  from the CIT  are allowed:  the initial  investment  allowance  and the annual
depreciation  allowance.  Investment  in machinery  and  plant is strongly  encouraged  through  tax incentives;
such investments  are entitled  to both the initial  allowance  and the annual  depreciation  allowance  available
to all taxable  fims.
3Businesses employing more than 5 workers must contribute to the National Social
Security Fund  (NSSF), which  finances pensions  and other  forms of  worker benefits.
Since  1985 the social security contribution for employers has been  10 percent of wage
payments (excluding allowances) with no ceiling, with employees contributing 5 percent
of their  gross  salary. Rates remained unchanged in  1997. The NSSF is viewed  as an
inefficient organization providing little service, making compliance with this levy more
difficult.
The 1991 Investment Code
In addition to the general Tax Code, the principal source of tax exemptions has
been the 1991 Investment Code. Until the income tax reform of 1997, it provided firrns
undertaking investment projects with full or partial exemption from CIT and dividend tax
for 3 to 6 years. 4 As mentioned above, the minimum threshold for the project investment
was  established at $50,000 for domestic  investors and $300,000 for foreign investors.
Exemptions  also included  import duties and sales  taxes on plant  and machinery until
1995 when they were discontinued and replaced by zero rating of capital goods for all
investors.
Ministry of Finance 's Statutory Instrument
The Minister of Finance has powers to grant tax exemptions to businesses  and
nongovernmental organizations on an ad hoc basis (that is, following no specific rules or
criteria for granting exemptions) through the use of statutory instruments. On a case-by-
case basis  selected firms received exemptions  from CIT,  import duties, and  domestic
sales taxes. Due to the negative effect of special regimes on equity, tax administration
efficiency, and lost tax revenues, attempts have been made to curtail the extent of such
exemptions since 1993. Budget speeches from 1993 to 1996 included initiatives aimed at
reducing  the  extent  of  tax  exemptions,  but  without  effective  enforcement  measures
(Reinikka  1997, Short 1995). Enactment provisions were  finally included  in the  1997
budget, but many enterprises still continue to pressure policymakers for tax exemptions.
III. Data: Enterprise Survey and Sample
This  study uses detailed  information on taxes  and  firm characteristics  from  a
survey of 243 firms in Uganda conducted by the World Bank and the Ugandan Private
4Another  set of tax exemptions  applicable  to the government,  public  bodies,  and privileged
organizations  and individuals  rather  than  to businesses,  is govemed  by the  2nd  Schedule  of the Finance
Statute (no. 9, 1994, supplement no. 6, September). This schedule lists 19 categories of conditional
exemptions and 15 international organizations receiving exemptions from inport duties, sales tax, and
export taxes.
4Sector Foundation.  Firms  were  interviewed  in  1998 on  their  activities  in  1995-97,
including  physical  investment,  exports,  infrastructure  services,  taxation,  policy
credibility,  regulation,  and  corruption.  Because  the  survey  requested  confidential
information-costs,  sales, and tax payments-interviews  were carried out by the Uganda
Manufacturers Association to obtain maximum cooperation. In addition to quantitative
data, the survey also collected firms' perceptions on various constraints to investment.
The latest  complete industrial  census in Uganda  was taken  in  1989. A partial
industrial census update from  1996 included only 8 out of the 39 districts. Despite its
limited geographical coverage, the 8 districts in  the 1996 update actually represent 80
percent  of value added in the private  industrial sector and 70 percent  of employment,
based on  the  1989 census. The sampling frame of the survey was based  on the 1996
update for that reason as well as to capture the dramatic increase in the number of new
enterprises since 1989. Based on the 1996 update, 37 percent of the firms active in 1996
were established since  1990. Although the district of Mbarara was not  included in the
census update, it was added to the survey because of its importance as a regional business
center today.
A stratified random sample for the survey was constructed using the following
criteria:
*  The sample should be reasonably representative of th1e  population of establishments in
the five specified industrial categories.
*  The establishments surveyed should account for a substantial share of national output
in each of the industrial categories.
- The sample should be sufficiently diverse in terms of firm size.
*  There should be  enough representation outside Kampala to  draw conclusions about
industrial activity in Uganda as a whole.
Businesses  from  five  major  economic  sectors  were  interviewed.  The
manufacturing sector, including agroprocessing, accounts  for the largest percentage  of
firms in the sample, with 66 percent. The other three sectors are commercial agriculture
(13 percent), tourism (12 percent), and construction (9 percent). As  for size categories,
large firms represent less than 20 percent of the sample, while firms with less than 21
employees represent 47 percent. Although the sample was drawn randomly from the 1996
updated industrial census, it tends to over-represent larger, more visible firms. This point
may be important when considering the tax evasion data.
Five different geographical areas covered included Kampala, Jinja-Iganga, Mbale-
Tororo, Mukono, and Mbarara. The first four account for 98 percent of total employment
in the five selected sectors reported in the 1996 census update. In terms of ownership (not
5a criterion for sample selection), 70 percent of firms were Ugandan-owned,  16 percent
foreign-owned, and 14 percent jointly owned. Table 1 presents the basic characteristics of
the businesses, including age, size and ownership.
Table 1. Basic Business  Statistics,  1997
Number of
Variable  observations  Mean  Std. deviation  Minimum  Maximum
Age  242  13.9  12.5  1  74
Number  of workers  242  124  259  2  2,000
Sales  225  2,730  1,040  0.900  98,000
Sales/worker  225  17  46.40  0.0357  611
Dom. Tax/sales  200  0.058  0.073  0  0.389
Comp. Tax/sales  216  0.007  0.017  0  0.127
Sales tax/sales  206  0.043  0.057  0  0.232
NSSF/sales  210  0.006  0.015  0  0.150
Foreign-owned  243  0.161  0.368  0  1
Joint venture  243  0.139  0.348  0  1
Note:  Age is in years in 1997.  Workers  include  permanent  and  temporary  workers.  Sales and sales  per
worker  are in millions  of Ush.  Domestic  tax/sales  includes  company  income  tax/sales,  sales  tax VAT/sales
and  NSSF/sales,  and  are  fractions.  Foreign  owned  and  jointly  foreign  and  domestic  owned  are  fractions.
Source:  Uganda  Enterprise  Survey  (1998).
IV. The Importance of Tax Evasion
This section examines the extent of tax evasion among sample firms during 1995-
97. In particular, we examine evasion patterns by type of tax and category of business.
Our definition of evasion comes from the sample firms' own declarations of tax payments
and exemptions. A business that said it did not pay a tax or group of taxes and reported
no full exemption was considered to evade. More specifically, for years 1995 and 1997,
the firms were asked if they paid the three main business taxes (corporate income tax,
sales tax NAT,  and the NSSF tax), and if so, how much. If they said they did not pay one
or more of these taxes, we examined their specific exemptions under the general  Tax
Code and special tax regimes. In accordance with the general Tax Code, a firm with no
taxable profit in 1995 and 1997 was not liable for the CIT. Firms with no sales in 1995
and sales under 50 million Ush in 1997 were not liable for the sales tax and the VAT.
Firms employing fewer than 5 workers or reporting no wage payments in both years were
not liable for the NSSF tax.
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The Venn diagrams in Figures 1 and 2 show the amount of tax paid, exemptions,
and evasion for each of the three main taxes in 1995 and 1997, respectively. Each circle
shows the number of firms paying one of the three taxes. Overlaps represent firms paying
more than one tax. In each area, a firm that does not pay a tax is classified either as an
exemption or an evasion. When a firm does not pay more than one tax, a cross tabulation
of exemptions and evasion is given.
As  Figure  1 shows,  of the  158 firms  for  which we  have  information  on  tax
payments and exemptions, 73 evaded at least one of the three taxes (46 percent). The least
evaded tax is the CIT, with 28 cases, while the most evaded tax is the NSSF, with 55
cases (35 percent). Figure 1 also shows that 9 firms (outside the circles) did not pay any
of the 3 taxes in 1995.
Figure 2 presents the Venn diagram for tax payments, evasion, and exemptions in
1997. It shows a relative decline in the number of tax evaders during the period, as 44
percent (83 firms out of 187) are estimated to evade at least one tax. As in 1995, the most
evaded tax is still the NSSF (55 firms out of 187), while the least evaded tax is now the
VAT, .which only 9 firms (5 percent) said they did not pay. This reduction in evasion is
probably due to the introduction of a minimum VAT threshold of 50 million Ush in sales
for  1997 (for  there  was  no  minimum  sales tax  threshold  in  1995),  and  also  to  the
introduction of a minimum CIT income tax for small businesses in 1997.
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Our calculations underestimate the real level of evasion for at least four reasons.
First, it is based on the firms' own declarations of tax payments, and some firms may not
have been honest  when answering questions about evasion. The reverse could also be
true, as truthful taxpayers may have said they evaded taxes that they in fact paid. Second,
exemption figures are also based  on the firms'  own reports, and some firms may have
over-represented  their  prevalence.  Third,  evasion  activities  may  be  underestimated
because  our  sample,  as pointed out  in  section 3,  over-represents  larger, more visible
firms.  .Lastly, our definition of evasion is complete tax evasion for at least one category of
tax,  and  we  did not  attempt to  determine whether the  firm paid the  legally required
amount.
Comparative figures for Cameroon, where a similar study was conducted in fiscal
year  1993/1994, showed that 96 out  of a total sample of  197 firms were identified as
evading  at  least  one  of  the  three  main  business  taxes  in  1993/1994  (Gauthier  and
Gersovitz 1997). Interestingly, the evasion rate of 49 percent in Cameroon is the same as
that  observed  in  Uganda  in  1995,  despite  the  different  social,  political,  and
colonial/historic  conditions  in  the two  countries. The next  section  examines  in  more
detail the prevalence of evasion and exemptions by category of firm, and their impact on
effective tax burdens.
8V. Exemptions,  Evasion,  and Tax Burdens
We now turn to the relationship between evasion, the distribution of special tax
privileges,  and their impact on effective tax burdens by category of firm. Tax burden is
measured by the amount paid for the three main domestic taxes divided by sales values.
Our sample is  smaller than the one  used in  section 4, because some  firms that  were
willing to  say whether or not they paid a specific tax were unwilling to say how much
they paid.
As  Table  1  shows,  the  domestic  tax  burden  represented  by  the  three  main
domestic  taxes  (CIT,  sales  tax/VAT,  and  NSSF)  is  6  percent  of  sales  value.  The
distribution of tax rates shows a large standard deviation of 7 percent in  1997. Table  1
also presents the ratio of payments of each of the three main taxes relative to sales. The
single  most  important  tax  is  clearly the  sales  tax,  with  a  ratio  of  4  percent.  This
corresponds to a third of the minimum general sales tax rate of 12 percent.
Table 2 presents the average domestic tax burden for five categories of firm size.
Firm size categories are based on the number of employees (permanent and temporary) in
both 1995 and 1997. We observe that, for both years, the domestic tax ratio first rises and
then falls with size. While the smaller category (2-5  employees) faces a tax burden of 3
percent,  firms with  26-75  employees support an average burden of  7 percent  and the
largest category (>200 employees) has a burden of 2 percent. A similar inverted U-shaped
relationship between size and tax burden is obtained for 1997, despite the fact that the tax
burden for larger firms increased to 6 percent, up from 2 percent in 1995.
Table 2 also shows the prevalence of various exemptions and evasions by  firm
size category.  The most  frequent tax privilege is  the CIT  exemption, reported by  36
percent of firms in  1995 (see last column). Larger firms benefit disproportionately from
this privilege (71 percent) compared with smaller firms (20 percent). Sales tax exemption
is the  second most prevalent exemption within the sample, reported by 26 percent  of
respondents. Overall, half the firms in the sample said they benefited from at least one of
the three special  programs, although the figure rose to  79 percent  among large firms.
Despite the tax reform objective of curtailing special tax regimes, the level of exemptions
was  still  very  high  at  the  end  of  the  three-year period.  Indeed,  the  prevalence  of
exemptions  actually  increased  from  50 percent  in  1995 to  54 percent  in  1997.  The
increase was particularly noteworthy for CIT exemptions, which rose from 36 percent in
1995 to 44 percent in 1997, and for import duties, which rose from 20 percent in 1995 to
25 percent in 1997.
As Table 2 also shows, smaller firms appear to reduce their tax payments mainly
by evasion, while larger firms tend to  reduce their tax obligations through official tax
incentive  programs.  Indeed, smaller  and larger  firm size categories tend to  support  a
lighter tax burden than medium-sized firms, which tend to shoulder a heavier tax burden.
9This pattern remained unchanged in  1995 and  1997. A similar pattern was observed in
Cameroon,  where  medium-sized  firms  faced  a  disproportionately  heavy  tax  burden
compared with smaller and larger firms. These findings seem to suggest that the inverted
U-shaped relationship between taxes and size derives from the relationship between tax
erosion patterns and firm size. Annex Figures 1 and 2 investigate this relationship through
nonparametric regressions.5
Table 2. Variation in Tax Erosion by Firm Size
Number  of employees
Variable  2-5  6-25  26-75  76-200  200>  All
1995
Domestic  tax / sales ratio  0.031  0.052  0.074  0.069  0.021  0.057
Exemptions
CIT  0.200  0.313  0.294  0.381  0.714  0.361
Import  duties  0.200  0.271  0.118  0.143  0.214  0.197
Sales tax/VAT  0.200  0.375  0.177  0.010  0.357  0.262
At least one exemption  0.200  0.500  0.471  0.429  0.786  0.500
Evasion
Evader  0.800  0.813  0.324  0.571  0.286  0.574
Evade  all  0  0.063  0.029  0.048  0.071  0.049
Sample  size  5  48  34  21  14  122
1997
Domestic  tax / sales ratio  0.021  0.052  0.078  0.082  0.059  0.065
Exemption
CIT  0.250  0.273  0.353  0.522  0.722  0.407
Import  duties  0.250  0.227  0.206  0.217  0.222  0.220
Sales  tax/VAT  0.500  0.318  0.235  0.261  0.222  0.276
At least one exemption  0.500  0.455  0.471  0.478  0.722  0.504
Evasion
Evader  0.750  0.773  0.412  0.391  0.222  0.520
Evade all  0  0  0.029  0  0  0.008
Sample  size  4  44  34  23  18  123
Note: Domestic  tax/sales  includes  CIT,  sales tax-VAT  and NSSF/sales  value.  All figures  except  sarnple  size
are fractions.
As  noted  in  Table  2  and  Annex  Figures  1 and  2  (and  as  observed  also  in
Cameroon),  the  fact  that  medium-sized  firms  support  the  heaviest  tax  burden  in
proportion to sales suggests that they have a competitive disadvantage relative to smaller
and larger firms. As noted by Gauthier and Gersovitz (1995), all other things being equal,
medium-sized firms would tend to be less numerous than if the tax system were neutral
5 The figures  for both 1995  and 1997  were  obtained  using  the Lowess  option of the KSM procedure  of
STATA  6.0 with  a bandwidth  of 0.99.
10with regard to size. Indeed, if this tax pattern proves to be prevalent in poor countries, it
may contribute to the phenomenon of the missing-middle, or a tendency  for medium-
sized firms to be under-represented in poor countries. 6
We  further  examine the  relationship between  tax  level  and  firm size through
regression analysis in Table 3. All regressions were run using a Huber-White correction
for heteroskedasticity. The first regression in column 1 simply examines the relationship
between tax rates and firm size. We observe that in 1995 finns with 6-200  employees pay
a  significantly  higher  tax  ratio  than  the  smallest  category.  The  second  regression
examines the relationship between tax rates and various exemption programs and evasion
behavior. It shows that the most important privilege is the sales tax exemption, and that
evasion also has a significant impact in reducing a firm's tax burden. The third regression
shows that  only the  firms with  6-25  employees remains  significant when the erosion
variables  are taken  into account. This suggests that the  main phenomenon behind the
inverted  U-shaped  relationship  between  tax  ratio  and  firm  size  is  the  evasion  and
exemption pattern.
As  shown in the bottom part of Table 3, similar results were also obtained for
1997. All  firm  size categories shoulder  a heavier tax  burden than  the small category
(regression 1). Again, sales tax exemptions are the most significant tax incentive program
and tax evasion also considerably reduces tax burdens (regression 2). Firms with 26-75
employees have a significantly heavier tax burden than the small category. Again, the U-
shaped relationship  is explained by erosion patterns among size categories (regression
o)7 3) .
Table 4 shows the variation in tax ratios, evasion, and exemption by sector. The
smallest tax ratios are observed in the construction (3 percent) and agriculture sectors (4
percent),  while  the other manufacturing  sector has  the  highest ratio  (7 percent).  The
construction  sector also has the lowest level of overall  exemptions and evasion, while
agriculture  has  the  highest  evasion level  (79  percent),  as  well  as  a  relatively  high
exemption rate (58 percent). The second-lowest exemption rate (42 percent) was reported
by the other manufacturing sector.
6 For a discussion  of the missing-middle  phenomenon  see Steel  and Webster  (1992).
7Regressions  were also  run with  size and size squared  variables.  Both variables  had a correct  sign but
were  not statistically  significant.  However,  the use of size dummnies  allows  focusing  on specific  segments  of
the size distribution  and for the results  to be comparable  with  those obtained  in Cameroon  (see  Gauthier  and
Gersovitz  1995,  Table  4).
11Table 3. Regressions  of Taxes  Paid as Ration  of Sales
(1)  (2)  (3)
Tax rate  Coeff  I  t I  Coeff:  I t I  Coeff:  I t
1995
S2  .030**  2.33  .028*  1.83
S3  .042**  2.91  .014  0.83
S4  .041**  2.37  .017  0.85
S5  .030  1.35  -.012  0.49
CIT exemption  .008  0.56  .015  0.94
Import duties exempt  -.0002  0.01  -.005  0.22
Sales tax/VAT exempt  -.049**  2.33  -.051"**  2.56
Evader  -. 045**  3.45  -. 053**  3.56
Constant  .018**  2.12  .095**  8.14  .082**  4.73
Level ofjoint
significance
S2-S3 & S4-S5  0.026  --  0.277
S2-S3  0.009  --
S4-S5  0.044  --  --
Rsquare  0.02  0.18  0.20
Sample size  169  124  124
1997
S2  .032**  2.77  .023  1.19
S3  .051**  2.39  .043*  1.79
S4  .048**  3.21  .033  1.45
S5  .049**  3.05  -.013  0.51
CIT exemption  .007  0.40  .009  0.47
Import duties exempt  .016  0.64  .014  0.58
Sales taxlVAT exempt  .058**  4.40  -.058**  4.33
Evader  -. 034**  2.79  -.032**  2.31
Constant  .020**  2.34  .093**  9.19  .064**  3.04
Level  of  joint
significance
S2-S3  & S4-S5  0.001  --  0.347
S2-S3  0.001  --  --
S4-S5  0.001  --  --
R square  0.04  0.18  0.20
Sample size  202  143  143
Note:  * Significant  at the 10  percent  level, ** significant  at the 5 percent  level.  S2: Dununy  for size 2
category  (6-25 employees),  S3: Duxmy  for size 3 category  (26-75 emnployees),  S4: Dununy  for size 4
category  (76-200 employees),  S5: Dunmy for size 5 category  (200>  emnployees).  The omitted
category  is SI: Dunmmy  for size 1 category  (2-5 employees).
12Table 4. Variation in Tax Erosion by Sector
Sector
Other
Variable  Agriculture Agroprocessing  manufacturing Construction  Tourism
1995
Domestic  tax / sales ratio  0.037  0.043  0.074  0.025  0.056
Exemptions
CIT  0.158  0.480  0.415  0.000  0.389
Inport duties  0.158  0.120  0.208  0.286  0.278
Sales tax/VAT  0.526  0.280  0.208  0.143  0.167
At least one exemption  0.579  0.640  0.415  0.286  0.556
Evasion
Evader  0.790  0.560  0.528  0.429  0.556
Evade  all  0.053  0.080  0.038  0  0.056
Sample  size  19  25  53  7  18
1997
Domestic  tax / sales ratio  0.034  0.040  0.093  0.039  0.067
Exemption
CIT  0.191  0.520  0.481  0.222  0.375
Import  duties  0.191  0.120  0.269  0.222  0.250
Sales tax/VAT  0.619  0.280  0.192  0  0.250
At least one exemption  0.571  0.640  0.442  0.333  0.500
Evasion
Evader  0.571  0.560  0.481  0.444  0.563
Evade all  0.048  0  0  0  0
Sample  size  21  25  52  9  16
Similar  patterns  are observed  for  1997, with  the  agriculture  and  construction
sectors  still reporting  the  lightest  tax burdens,  along with  the  agroprocessing sector.
Again, the  agroprocessing and  agriculture sectors benefited  from the  highest level  of
exemptions  (64 and  57 percent, respectively), and the manufacturing  and construction
sectors from the lowest level (42 and 33 percent, respectively). Evasion was highest for
the agroprocessing and tourism sectors (56 percent).
Table  5  examines  the  variation  in  tax  ratios,  evasion,  and  exemptions  by
ownership category. Domestic-owned  firms tended  to  shoulder half  the tax ratio  (4.5
percent) of foreign firms (8.3 percent) or joint-ownership firms (8.2 percent) in 1995. The
lighter burden of domestic firms was due mainly to the difference in evasion behavior,
with 64 percent of domestic firms classified as evaders compared with just 40 percent of
foreign-owned firms and 44 percent of joint-owned firms.
13Table 5. Variation  in Tax Erosion  by Ownership  Type
Sector
Variable  Domestic  Foreign  Joint
1995
Domestic  tax / sales  ratio  0.045  0.083  0.082
Exemptions
CIT  0.345  0.400  0.389
Import  duties  0.226  0.200  0.056
Sales tax/VAT  0.321  0.200  0.056
At least one exemption  0.524  0.500  0.389
Evasion
Evader  0.643  0.400  0.444
Evade all  0.048  0.050  0.056
Sample  size  84  20  18
1997
Domestic  tax / sales ratio  0.045  0.116  0.093
Exemption
CIT  0.378  0.524  0.400
Import  duties  0.220  0.333  0.100
Sales taxNVAT  0.354  0.143  0.100
At least one exemption  0.512  0.571  0.400
Evasion
Evader  0.634  0.333  0.250
Evade  all  0.012  0  0
Sample  size  82  21  20
During  1995-97, the tax ratios of domestic firms remained stable at 4.5 percent,
while tax rates of foreign firms increased to an average of 11.6 percent from 8.3 percent,
and those  of joint-owned firms increased to 9.3 percent from 8.2 percent. Furthermore,
evasion levels among domestic firms remained high and stable at 62 percent. Evasion
among foreign and joint-owned firms actually declined.
VI. Tax Burdens  and Dispersion
As discussed earlier, tax reform programs have been initiated since the mid-i 990s
with the objective of widening the tax base and increasing domestic tax revenues. Reform
initiatives have included the introduction of a VAT and attempts to curtail the special tax
regimes in order to level the playing field. Were these objectives achieved?
We  examine  the  changes in  tax rates  for different  categories of  firms  at the
beginning  and the end of the period. Table 6 presents the distribution of exemptions in
141995 and  1997 and their importance in terms of sales and value of imports within the
sample. The sample is  slightly smaller than in section 3, because  some firns  did not
report information on import value for both years. The firms are grouped as follows: in
addition  to  the  firms with  reductions  or  exemptions  of CIT,  import  duties  and  sales
tax/VAT, we also distinguish firms benefiting from at least one of these three special tax
regimes. As noted in  Table 2, almost half the firms in the sample enjoyed at least one
special  tax  privilege,  and  the  overall  proportion  remained  stable  during  the  period
examined. There was some variation among categories, however. In particular, the CIT
exemption increased to 38 percent in 1997 from 34 percent in 1995. When measured in
terms of sales, however, the trend is somewhat different. Businesses enjoying special tax
regimes represented 56 percent of sales value in the 1995 sample, and 73 percent in 1997.
Furthermore, the increase  in the importance of special regimes is  also apparent  when
measured in  terms of imports, since firms receiving at least one  special tax privilege
accounted for 76 percent of import value in 1997 compared with just 62 percent in 1995.
Some of these changes can be attributed to the dramatic increase in private investment
following the 1994-95 coffee boom.
Table 6. Evolution of Exemptions
1995  1997
Percentage  of firms  under special  regimes
Corporate  income  tax  33.9  37.7
Import  duties  18.9  19.8
Sales  tax/VAT  26.4  27.4
At least one exemption  47.2  47.2
Privileged  firms' sales as a percentage  of total sales  56.1  72.6
Privileged  firms' imports  as a percentage  of total imports  62.1  75.7
Sample  size  109  109
This evidence suggests that the tax reform programs during the 1995-97 period
were not effective in curtailing special tax regimes, widening the tax base, or increasing
revenues. On the contrary, it appears that the prevalence of exemption regimes actually
increased  during the  period, particularly  when measured  in  terms of  sales  value  and
imports.
The effects of the change in tax regimes during the period are quantified in Table
7, which  presents  the reported  tax burden  in  each  fiscal year. Average domestic  tax
payments are presented as a proportion of sales (CIT, sales tax/VAT and NSSF) together
with  a  breakdown  of  direct  and  indirect  taxes.  The  figures  show  how  the  different
business categories were affected by tax system and tax administration changes during
this period.
15Table 7. Average Tax Rates for Different Categories of Firms Based on Their





CIT  4.06  5.05
Import  duties  2.21  3.03
Sales Tax/VAT  0.76  2.17
At least one exemption  3.26  4.15
No privileges  6.10  6.90
Direct tax/Sales
Privilegedfirms
CIT  0.80  0.58
Import  duties  1.33  1.09
Sales tax/VAT  0.75  0.45
At least one exemption  0.79  0.67
No privileges  1.15  1.23
Indirect  tax/Sales
Privilegedfirms
Company  tax  3.26  4.46
Import  duties  0.88  1.93
Sales tax/VAT  0  1.72
At least one exemption  2.47  3.48
No privileges  4.59  5.68
Sample size  109  109
Note: Domestic  tax: CIT, sales  tax/VAT  and  NSSF;  direct  tax: CIT and NSSF;  indirect  tax: sales
tax/VAT.
The firms benefiting from  at least one  special tax regime in  1995 reported an
average domestic tax ratio of only 3.3 percent,  almost half that of firms not benefiting
from  special regimes  (6.1 percent).  In  1997, this  gap,  although  slightly smaller,  was
nevertheless  40 percent,  with  special  status firms paying 4.2 percent  of their  sales in
taxes, compared with 6.9 percent for nonprivileged firms.
The direct tax ratios of special status firms fell from an average of 0.7 percent
from their 1995 level of 0.8 percent, while those of common law firms increased to 1.23
percent from 1.15 percent.
With respect to indirect tax, and in line with the reform program objectives, the
new VAT has led to an increase in tax levels among categories of firms, and a reduction
in the gap between privileged and non-privileged firms. However, the gap between the
two groups was still 62 percent in 1997, down from 86 percent in 1995.
16Table 8. Taxes Paid as a Percentage of Value Added
1995  1997
Domestic Tax / VAT
Mean  5.86 (9.34)  9.17 (11.54)
Weighted  mean  7.33  7.32
Direct tax / VAT
Mean'  2.91 (5.36)  2.63 (4.26)
Weighted  mean  2.77  1.57
Indirect tax / VAT
Mean  2.96 (6.16)  6.54 (9.61)
Weighted  mean  4.56  5.75
Sample  size  114  114
Note: Firm gross output  is used as weights.  Domestic  tax:  CIT,  sales  tax/VAT  and  NSSF;  direct  tax: CIT  and
NSSF; indirect  tax:  sales  tax/VAT.  Standard  deviation  in parenthesis.
Dispersion  in Tax Burdens
Given the tax reform's  objective of increasing  efficiency and  equity in the tax
system, it is relevant to ask whether the reform has in fact moved the tax structure toward
more  uniformity in  tax payments.  Indeed, if we  assume that  an ideal tax  system is  a
neutral  value added tax, the variance in tax burdens as a ratio of value added could be
seen as a crude indicator of deviation from this ideal system (Tybout and others 1997).
. Table 8 presents unweighted and weighted averages and variance in tax payments
for both 1995 and 1997, with domestic tax expressed as a ratio of value added. Tax ratios
are also broken down into direct and indirect tax payments.
On average,  tax rates  (unweighted) increased  from  5.9 percent  to  9.2 percent
during the period, but contrary to the objective of leveling the playing field, dispersion
also  increased  (see  standard  deviations  in  parenthesis).  This  was  due  mainly  to  an
increase  in  the  dispersion  of  indirect  tax  following  the  introduction  of  the  VAT.
Furthermore, there was little change in the tax burden by size category during the period,
with weighted average tax rates remaining stable at 7.3 percent. However, the large size
categories paid more indirect tax (VAT) at the end of the period, but offset by a lighter
direct  tax burden.  Overall, the indirect tax burden  increased to  6.5 percent,  from  3.0
percent.  The  evidence suggests that  the reforms  were  successful in  directing  the tax
burden toward  production-based taxes, but  not  in leveling the playing  field, since the
importance  of special  regimes increased,  as did  the dispersion of  tax burdens  among
businesses.
17VII. The Role of Tax Administration
In order to assess the characteristics of the Ugandan tax administration, firms were
asked  about various  forms  of contacts with  the URA. For  example, they were  asked
whether they had been audited by the URA, if there were any differences between the
firm's  self-declaration and the revenue authority's  assessment over the last three years
(that is, in 1995-97), and if so, the percentage of the difference. They were also asked if
they had to pay bribes to public officials, including tax collectors, and if so, how much.
Table 9 presents information on these contacts by size category.
The sample firms were also asked to rank a number of constraints, including tax
administration  and  tax  burdens.  Tax administration  was  perceived  as the  sixth  most
binding constraint overall (out of 24). Table 9 shows the percentage of firms reporting
moderate to severe constraints (score between 3 and 5 on the scale of 1 to 5). On average,
64  percent  of  the respondents  ranked tax  administration  and  tax burdens  as  a major
constraint  (score  4).  With  regard  to  customs,  32  percent  of  respondents  felt  they
represented  a  major  constraint.  Customs-related constraints  increased  with  firm  size,
reflecting the fact that large firms are often importers.
Table 9. Tax Administration
Number of employees
Variable  2-5  6-25  26-75  76-200  > 200  All
Audit
CIT  0.313  (16)  0.227  (88)  0.539  (52)  0.525 (40)  0.636 (33)  0.415 (229)
VAT  0.188  (16)  0.524 (84)  0.623 (53)  0.800 (40)  0.719 (32)  0.600 (225)
Assessments
In the last 3 years  0.200  (15)  0.528  (89)  0.536 (560)  0.575 (40)  0.500 (32)  0.513 (232)
If yes, difference
in assessment
in (%)  0.867  (3)  0.979 (96:  0.885 (28)  0.723  (21,  0.430 (15'  0.832  (113:
Bribe
Amount  0.067  (8)  0.678 (63)  5.583  (43)  11.2 (36)  23.7 (26)  7.40 (176)
Bribe/sales  0.394 (7)  2.72 (63)  3.59 (41)  1.57  (33)  0.124 (24)  0.240 (168)
Bribe/workers  9.57 (7)  55.63 (63)  121.11  (43)  92.32  (36)  62.78 (26)  78.49 (175)
Frequency  tax*  12.5  (16)  42.7 (89)  35.04 (57)  53.49  (43)  59.38 (32)  43.04 (237)
Frequency
Custom*  10.00  (10)  29.17  (72)  29.55 (44)  55.00 (40)  58.06 (31)  38.07 (197)
Constraint**
Tax  56.3 (16)  58.89 (94)  67.85 (56)  69.77 (43)  66.66 (33)  63.87 (238)
Custom  20 (15)  19.55  (87)  28.3 (53)  44.18 (43)  59.37 (32)  31.74 (230)
Note:  Number  of  finns  in  parenthesis;  bribe  amounts  in million  Ush;  * percentage  of firms  having  to pay
bribes  occasionally  to always  (between  3 and  5 on the  scale  of 1 to 5) when  dealing  with  taxes  and  tax
collection;  **  percentage  of finms  ranking  the  constraint  from  moderate  to severe  obstacle  (between  3 and  5
on the  scale  of 1 to 5).
18Tax Audits
The  URA  frequently makes  use  of  tax  audits,  in  the  form  of  desk  or  field
operations,  or a mixture of both. Predetermined audit criteria do not  exist, but  factors
such as the firm's  compliance record, the quality of its returns and its size are said to be
important. Indeed, the frequency of audits tends to increase with firrn size. Overall, 41
percent of firms said they had been audited for the CIT, while as many as 60 percent had
been audited for the VAT. The latter figure is equivalent to 75 percent of all VAT-paying
firms.  The  number of  audits in  Uganda  is  high  compared  with  other countries.  For
example, in Canada all large corporations (about 1,000) are audited, while for the rest
(about 13,000) face audit rates of 5 percent or less. The high auditing frequency indicates
a serious lack of voluntary compliance and a low level of mutual trust between the tax
authority and the taxpayer (Chen and Reinikka 1999).
A probit analysis of the firm survey data reveals features of the auditing practice
(Table 10). The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value one if the firm was
audited and zero otherwise. With respect to corporate income tax, there are noticeable
Table 10. A Probit Model for the Incidence of Tax Audits
Equation  AuditCIT  AuditVAT
Constant  -1.255  -1.184
(-3.75)  (--3.098)
Log(size)  0.301  0.291
(3.757)  (3.654)
Profit  -1.13E-11  -1.08E-l1 
(-1.486)  (--1.497)
Construction  0.151  0.238
(0.416)  (0.656)
Manufacturing  -0.382  0.338
(-1.488)  (1.291)
Tourism  0.301  0.931
(0.867)  (2.419)
Agriculture  -0.423  --0.447
(-1.243)  (--1.304)
Kampala  0.612  0.353
(2.951)  (1.676)




Number  of observations  200  197
Ln (likelihood)  -116.39  -110.31
Note: All variables  except  dummies  are averages  over  a three-year  period (1995-97).  t-values  in
parenthesis.
19differences between the firms that were  audited and those that were not  audited in the
previous  three  years.  Three  explanatory  variables  are  significant. First,  as  might  be
expected, the  firms avoiding tax  audits were typically smaller.  Second,  firms  located
outside the capital city Kampala were also less likely to be audited. Third, firms that had
been  granted corporate tax exemptions  were  less likely to  face a corporate  tax  audit.
Consequently,  the  firms  that  reported  audits for  corporate  tax  were  typically  larger,
located in Kampala, and did not have corporate tax exemptions. However, profitability of
the firm or the sector does not appear to affect the incidence of corporate tax audits. There
are some differences in the profile of firms audited for the VAT. As was the case for the
CIT, the firms audited for the VAT were typically larger, but in their case location of the
firm did not matter (Table 10). Interestingly, firms in the tourism sector were much more
likely to be audited for the VAT than firms in other sectors; As we saw above, tax evasion
was highest in tourism (and agroprocessing).
Assessments
When the URA "assesses" the tax returns submitted by businesses, the firm's own
tax assessment may be accepted, or the tax officer may determine a higher assessment
requiring an additional tax payment. As  Table 9 shows, about half of the firms in the
sample had  disagreed with  the URA  over  their tax  assessment  during  1995-97.  The
difference in the assessment averaged 83 percent of the firm's  tax payments, which is a
high  share.  While  the  difference  in  tax  assessment  as  a  percentage  of  tax  payment
decreases with firm size, there appears to be a clear relationship between the frequency of
differences in tax assessments and the size of the firm.
A probit analysis of the probability of a disagreement with the URA  over a tax
assessment  during  1995-97  shows  that  this  probability  is  significant  and  negatively
correlated with tax exemptions, and significant and positively correlated with  corporate
tax audits, but not with VAT audits (Table  11). The size of the firm is not significant,
however, when we control for exemptions and audits.























Number  of observations  196
Ln(likelihood)  -122.97
Note: All  variables  except  dummies  are  averages  during  1995-97.  t-values  in parenthesis.
It seems quite obvious that the more exemptions a firm has, the less likely it is to
disagree over its tax assessment. Similarly, since a tax audit is often carried out if the
initial  (desk)  assessment  by  the  revenue  authority  differs  from  the  taxpayer's  own
declaration,  it is not  surprising that the audit becomes  significant and positive in  the
regression. The VAT audit might also be expected to be significant, but it is not. Other
factors, such as sector, location, size and the profitability of the firm are not significant
either, suggesting the absence of a clear firm profile in the incidence of disagreements
over the tax officer's assessment. 8
8 To examine  the extent  to which  the tax assessment  differed  from a firm's own declaration,  we use the
same  explanatory  variables,  i.e., sector,  location,  size and profitability  of the firm, access  to tax exemptions,
and whether  or not the firm has  been audited.  The regression  results,  adjusted  for selectivity  as only  those
firms  that  had disagreements  were included,  shows  that none of these  variables  is significant.
21Bribes
Firms were also asked if they usually paid special amounts or bribes to tax and
customs  officers, and if so, the amount. Bribe payments to tax officials are a means of
gaining favors, and especially of reducing tax obligations or payments. As emphasized by
Shleifer  and Vishny (1993), bribe payments to  public  officials  lead to  inequities  and
inefficiencies in tax administration, since they result in a transfer to private agents of a
public  resource,  thus  reducing  government  revenues.  They  also  constitute  a  major
impediment to equitable and efficient tax administration, placing firms that do not engage
in such practices at a competitive disadvantage. It is therefore  important to  assess the
extent of the practice. As Table 9 shows, 102 of 237 firms (43 percent) reported paying
bribes to tax officials occasionally to always, while 75 out of 197 (38 percent) reported
having to pay bribes to customs officials. The frequency increases with firrm  size, since 60
percent  of  large  firms  said  they paid  bribes  to  tax  officials  (occasionally to  always)
compared with just  13 percent of smaller firms. The average amount of bribes paid to
public  officials was Ush 7.4 million or 0.24 percent of annual sales (see also Svensson
2001). The actual burden of bribe extraction by public officials, which falls in absolute
terms on larger firms, is in fact heavier for medium-sized firms, which pay larger bribes.
Indeed, in  terms of  the ratio of bribe payments to  sales value  and the ratio  of bribe
payments per worker, medium-sized firms again pay more, at 3.5 percent of sales for the
26-75  employee category. This is 29 times more per unit of sales than larger firms, and 9
times more than smaller firms.
Accounting
Another  difficulty associated with effective tax administration  and the resulting
tax  evasion  problems is  the  failure of  many businesses  to  keep tax records.  Radian
(1980), for example, reports that some smaller businesses may not keep accounts of their
own operations because their owners, managers or operators may be illiterate.
The behavior of our sample firms in Uganda (as in Cameroon) does not  support
this assertion. As Table 12 shows, 91 percent of firms actually kept accounts. There were
significant differences between size categories. Only 38 percent of small firms (less than
6 employees) kept books. However, as many as 89 percent of firms with between 6 and
76 employees said they kept accounts, and all firms with more than 76 employees said
they did. While almost all the firms that did not keep accounts were evaders (94 percent),
over half of the evaders kept accounts. Some  13 percent of the firms evading all three
taxes  (corporate  tax,  VAT, and NSSF)  did  not  keep accounts.  Similar  behavior  was
observed in Cameroon.
22Table 12. Variation in Evasion and Keeping Accounts (1997)
Keep accounts
Yes  No
All firms  91.1  8.9
Evader  51.2  93.8
Evade all taxes  0.6  12.5
Sample  size  164.0  16.0
Source:  Uganda  Enterprise  Survey  (1998).
VIII.  Conclusion
Tax administration and tax system reforms have been important components in
Uganda's  economic reform program since the early 1990s. The main objectives of these
government initiatives have been to increase public revenue and level the playing field by
enlarging the tax base, curtailing special tax regimes, introducing a VAT, and attempting
to  increase  tax  administration's  efficiency,  in  particular  by  reducing  corruption  and
evasion.
Based on firm-level data collected from 243 businesses in a survey conducted by
the World Bank and the Private Sector Foundation, this paper investigated the prevalence
of tax  evasion and  exemptions  among businesses in  Uganda  and their  effects on the
distribution of tax burdens during  1995-97. We observed that, despite the reforms, tax
evasion and exemptions were widespread and their prevalence actually increased during
the period studied. Exemptions increased in prevalence and importance as a proportion of
sales and import value, while evasion continued to be significant, affecting almost half
the  firms  in  the  sample.  The  evidence  indicates that  tax  exemptions  benefit  larger
businesses  to  a  disproportionate  degree, while  tax  evasion  is  more  common  among
smaller businesses.  This  creates  a  situation in  which  medium-sized  firms  shoulder  a
disproportionate tax burden. The inverted U-shaped relationship between tax burden and
firm  size  places  medium-sized  firms  at  a  competitive  disadvantage  compared  with
smaller and larger firms.
Furthermore, the dispersion of tax burdens (that is, the spread  of tax payments
among firms) increased during 1995-97,  which did not meet at least initially the stated
reform objective of leveling the playing field. This is explained mainly by the increased
variance of indirect tax burdens associated with the VAT. Indirect tax levels and total tax
levels, however, increased during the period studied, in accordance with the objective of
increasing government revenues.
Finally, firms audited  for corporate tax and the VAT by tax administration  are
typically  larger  and  do  not  have  access  to  (corporate  tax)  exemptions.  Half  of  the
23Ugandan firms challenged their tax assessment carried out by the revenue authority. The
difference  between  the authority's  assessment  and the  firm's  self-declaration was,  on
average, 83 percent. The probability that the firms' own assessment is different from that
of the tax administration's  is significant and negatively correlated with tax exemptions.
Indeed,  tax  exemptions  appear  to  be  an  effective  way  to  avoid  dealings  with  tax
administration, which otherwise appears more likely to target larger firms in its effort to
reduce evasion.
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